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NOTE

THE RIGHT RESULT FOR THE WRONG REASONS:
PERMITTING AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1367 IN MULTIPLAINTIFF DIVERSITY LITIGATION

I.

INTRODUCnON

Enacted as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,1 28
U.S.C. § 1367 codifies as "supplemental jurisdiction" the judicially developed doctrines of ancillary and pendentjurisdiction. This Note focuses specifically on § 1367's apparent abrogation of two landmark
Supreme Court decisions: Clark v. PaulGray, Inc.2 and Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co. 3 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs individually must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of § 1332 in order to retain federal diversity jurisdiction.
Recently, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits ruled that § 1367 supersedes these decisions. Writing for a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel,
Judge Easterbrook concluded in Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press
Mechanical, Inc.4 that § 1367 permits federal jurisdiction over a "permissive," Rule 20 plaintiff in spite of that plaintiff's failure to allege
damages in excess of § 1332's amount in controversy. Similarly,
Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit concluded in In re Abbott Laboratories5 that § 1367 permits jurisdiction over class action plaintiffs
who lack the required amount in controversy.
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits' analyses of § 1367's effect on
Clark and Zahn rest largely on a textually bound, "plain-meaning" in1
2

Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
306 U.S. 583 (1939).

3 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
4 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996).
5

51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
1045
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terpretation of § 1367. Taken literally, § 1367(a) allows federal courts
to hear supplemental claims which are part of the same case or controversy under Article III as claims in the action within the original
jurisdiction of the district court. This broad grant of authority is limited by § 1367(b), which provides:
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts
shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over
claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19,
20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or
seeking to intervene as plaintiffs underRule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplementaljurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with
the jurisdictionalrequirements of section 1332.6

Since § 1367(b) fails to exclude Rule 20 and Rule 23 plaintiffs from
the grant of supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367(a), the statute seems
to authorize supplemental jurisdiction over these types of plaintiffseven if their claims do not satisfy § 1332's amount in controversy.
Although this textual analysis of § 1367 produces the right result,
neither court's opinion adequately addressed other non-textual arguments in favor of § 1367's abrogation of Clark and Zahn. This Note
attempts to provide what the Fifth and Seventh Circuits left out of
their opinions: namely, a convincing justification for the result dictated by the "plain-meaning" of § 1367. To this end, I will argue that
Clark and Zahn produce inefficiencies which run counter to Congress's intentions in enacting § 1367. In fashioning § 1367, Congress
intended to streamline complex litigation by promoting the resolution of complex civil actions in one trial. Notwithstanding some legislative history to the contrary, the demise of Clark and Zahn is
consistent with this intent. The results dictated by both Clark and
Zahn produce duplicative and possibly preclusive litigation that burdens an already vexed federal judiciary. As such, both cases are contrary to the goals of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.
My argument will take the following form. In Part II, I will examine in detail the inefficiencies created by Clark and Zahn. Part III
will analyze the Fifth and Seventh Circuit's decisions in Abbott Laboratories and Stromberg Metal Works. Part IV will address the legislative history of § 1367 and argue that the demise of Clark and Zahn is
consistent with the intentions of Congress in enacting § 1367.

6

28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
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UNFAIRNEss: NON-

AGGREGATION IN CLARMXAND Zhw

The Supreme Court's decisions regarding the calculation of the
amount in controversy provide a good beginning for an analysis of
Clark and Zahn. In its interpretation of the "amount in controversy"
requirement, the Court has attempted to strike a balance between
§ 1332's limitations on diversity jurisdiction and the efficient and fair
packaging of complex litigation through the exercise of ancillary and
pendentjurisdiction. In Clark and Zahn, the Court upset this balance
without offering a compelling reason for doing so. Clark and Zahn
both require each plaintiff in a multi-plaintiff diversity action to meet
the statutory amount in controversy. This "non-aggregation rule"
runs counter to both precedent and policy.
A.

Background. Aggregation and the Amount in Controversy Requirement

By statute, the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts extends
to "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs." 7 Congress, since the

Judiciary Act of 1789, has required a minimum amount in controversy
to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.8 Originally,
Congress established ajurisdictional amount in order to provide a federal forum for out-of-state creditors. 9 At the time of the firstJudiciary
Act, state courts and legislatures were widely regarded as biased
against such creditors. 10 Since then, Congress has attempted to set
the figure high enough to protect the federal judiciary from frivolous
7 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) (emphasis added).
8 The Judiciary Act of 1789 initially imposed a $500 amount in controversy requirement. Congress increased that figure to $2,000 in 1887 and to $3,000 in 1911.
SeeAct of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552; Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch.2, § 24,
36 Stat. 1087, 1091. It remained at that level until 1951 when Congress increased it to
$10,000. See Act ofJuly 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415. Congress
raised the amount in controversy again to $50,000 in 1988. See The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646.
Congress set the current amount in controversy at $75,000 in 1996. See The Federal

Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205(a), 110 Stat. 3847, 3850
(codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (West Supp. 1998)).

9 See generally HenryJ. Friendly, The Historic Basis ofDiversityJurisdiction,41 HARv.
L. REv. 483, 501 (1928).

10 See generallyJohnP. Frank, ForMaintainingDiversityJurisdiction,73 YAE LJ.7, 9
(1963) (arguing that "this was largely a gloomy anticipation of things to come rather
than an experienced evil .... .").
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suits," yet low enough to allow individuals with substantial claims to
12

litigate in federal court.
Congress has left to the courts the task of determining how to
calculate the amount in controversy figure. Calculation is not problematic where the "matter in controversy" involves only a single plaintiff, a single defendant, and a single claim. In that case, the plaintiff
must allege damages in excess of § 1332's jurisdictional figure or face
dismissal. 13 These types of civil actions are the exception rather than
the rule. Litigation routinely involves multiple plaintiffs with multiple
claims, and some of these parties and claims may satisfy the jurisdictional amount in controversy while others may not.
In certain instances, courts have allowed plaintiffs to aggregate
their claims to meet the jurisdictional amount. The Supreme Court
has permitted aggregation where a plaintiff alleges multiple claims
which, taken as a whole, satisfy the jurisdictional amount in controversy.' 4 Also, where multiple plaintiffs sue a single defendant, they
may aggregate their claims when those claims are based on a "common and undivided interest."'15 Aggregation in this instance is rarer
than the language suggests. Courts have construed "common and undivided interest" narrowly, and they have held that such an interest
exists only when plaintiffs are suing for a common debt or when sev6
eral plaintiffs sue as joint owners of property.'
1.

The PinelDoctrine

Where none of the plaintiffs in a multi-plaintiff diversity action
satisfy § 1332's jurisdictional amount in controversy, plaintiffs may not
11 See ERWNIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICTION § 5.3, at 290 (2d ed. 1994) (suggesting that reducing the federal docket would be better served by excluding diversity
cases involving claims least likely to benefit from federal jurisdiction).
12 See S. REP. No. 85-1830, at 51 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101
(arguing that Congress has tried to set ajurisdictional amount "not... so high as to
convert the Federal courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away their
time in the trial of petty controversies").
13 The Supreme Court has ruled that the plaintiffs claim of damages must be
accepted unless it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover in excess of § 1332's amount in controversy. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab
Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938). This rule saves courts from having to hold adversarial and time-consuming hearings on the amount of damages in advance of the
actual litigation.
14 See Edwards v. Bates County, 163 U.S. 269 (1896) (permitting aggregation of
plaintiff's tort and contract claims against a single defendant).
15 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CrVIL PROCEDURE § 2.9, at 48-49 & n.5 (2d ed.
1993).
16 See id.
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aggregate their damages to satisfy that amount. Also known as the
"Pinel doctrine,"1 7 non-aggregation in this instance husbands scarce
judicial resources by keeping relatively petty claims out of federal
court.18 The Supreme Court developed the doctrine to reduce the
burgeoning federal docket following the Court's decision in Swift v.
Tyson, which allowed federal courts to fashion federal common law in
the absence of state statutory or constitutional provisions.' 9
The Pinel doctrine strikes a sensible balance between fairness to
litigants and the conservation of scarce judicial resources. Where
none of the plaintiffs has satisfied the amount in controversy, not a
single plaintiff has an independent basis for federal diversity jurisdiction. Since none of the plaintiffs could file independent suits in federal court, the entire action must be dismissed from federal court.
Thus, forbidding aggregation of claims in a Pinel scenario presents
little danger of duplicative federal and state litigation while preventing the over-use of the federal forum.
The Supreme Court's decision in Snyder v. Harris20 extended the
concept underlying the Pinel doctrine to class actions. In Snyder, the
Court addressed a split among the circuits regarding the viability of
the non-aggregation doctrine in light of the then recently revised Rule
23. Under the old Rule 23, class actions were divided into three categories: true, hybrid, and spurious. 21 True class actions were those in
which the rights of the claimants were common and undivided. In
these actions, aggregation was permitted. In spurious and hybrid class

17 See Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
18 See also Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920); Rogers v. Hennepin County, 239
U.S. 621 (1916); Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379 (1901).
19 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that, in absence of state statutory or constitutional provision, federal courts could fashion federal common law), overruledby Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield,
The ContemporaryFunction of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 704 n.66 (1941) (arguing that Swift encouraged forum shopping by litigants hoping to benefit from
favorable federal common law); see also Frank, supranote 10, at 9 (remarking that "the
great error of Swift v. Tyson and the federal choice of law permitted the gross abuse of
jurisdiction shopping") (footnote omitted). The forum shopping encouraged by

Swift is best illustrated in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). There, a Kentucky corporation dissolved and
reincorporated in Tennessee solely for the purpose of suing a Kentucky defendant in
federal court, where the federal common law produced a more favorable result for
the plaintiff than Kentucky common law.
20 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
21

The Court's discussion of old Rule 23 may be found in id. at 335.
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actions, however, aggregation was not permitted. 22 Spurious and hybrid class action plaintiffs each had to meet the requisite amount in
controversy in order to gain entrance to the class.
The modern Rule 23(b) (3) resembles the old spurious class action, and litigation arose over whether the revision permitted aggregation of claims. In district court, Margaret Snyder and a class of
similarly situated plaintiffs filed a stockholders derivative action
against the board of directors of an insurance company. 23 Federal
jurisdiction was based on diversity, but none of the plaintiffs in that
suit met the amount in controversy requirement. The Eighth Circuit,
in affirming the district court's dismissal of the action, held that the
adoption of the revised Rule 23 did not change the congressionally
enacted requirements of diversityjurisdiction. 24 That is, each plaintiff
seeking to join the class had to satisfy the amount in controversy.
The Tenth Circuit came to a different conclusion in a diversity
class action suit filed by customers of a gas company.2 5 In that case,
the plaintiffs alleged that they had been over-billed by the gas company, but none of the plaintiffs had been over-charged an amount
that exceeded the statutory amount in controversy of $10,000. Added
together, however, their claims would have exceeded that amount.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that, since aggregation was allowed in
some class actions and since Rule 23 abolished the distinctions among
the class actions, the new Rule 23 permitted aggregation in all class
26
actions.
The two cases were combined for review by the Supreme Court in
Snyder. In siding with the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court asserted
that "[t] he doctrine that separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated was never, and is not now, based upon the categories of old
Rule 23 or of any rule of procedure. That doctrine is based rather
upon this Court's interpretation of the statutory phrase 'matter in
controversy.' -27 The Court refused to extend its construction of "matter in controversy" to include the aggregation of all claims arising
22 The spurious class action was basically a form of permissive joinder in which
parties with separate and distinct claims that arose out of a common question of law
or fact were allowed to litigate against a single defendant. See id.
23 Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968).
24 Id. at 205.
25 See Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968).
26 Id. at 834.
27 Snyder, 394 U.S. at 336. The Court reasoned that Congress impliedly adopted
the judicial interpretation of "matter in controversy" by reenacting the jurisdictional
amount language without changing or modifying the judicial construction of that
amount. See id. at 339. The Court's reliance on congressional silence as ratification of
this judicial practice is somewhat dubious, though. Indeed, in an earlier decision, the
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from the same question of law or fact, which would have permitted
class plaintiffs to aggregate their claims.28 The Court noted that such
an extension would run counter to the congressional policy of curbing the rising tide of diversity cases facing the federal courts.2 9 Consequently, the Court dismissed the claims of each of the plaintiffs for
lack of jurisdiction.
Non-aggregation in this type of class action is sensible. None of
the plaintiffs in Snyder satisfied the amount in controversy requirement. Thus, the federal courts had no basis for jurisdiction over any
one of the plaintiffs. Dismissal ends federal jurisdiction over the entire claim, and it requires that the claim be resolved entirely at the
state level or not at all.
2.

Carrying Pinel Too Far: Clark and Zahn

Non-aggregation, however, lacks the same justification when applied to "mixed" diversity actions.30 Mixed diversity actions are those
in which at least one plaintiff has satisfied the amount in controversy
while other plaintiffs in the action have not. In these cases, at least
one plaintiffs claim will remain in federal court whether or not the
other plaintiffs are permitted to aggregate their claims. Non-aggregation makes no sense in this scenario. Indeed, it encourages duplicative litigation by forcing plaintiffs with jurisdictionally insufficient
claims to litigate in state court. This, of course, raises the specter of
preclusive judgments. More likely, though, prohibiting aggregation
in these cases will force the plaintiffs with jurisdictionally inadequate
claims to forgo litigation altogether. The costs of individually litigating their claims normally will outweigh the economic harm suffered
by each potential litigant. In these "mixed" diversity cases, then, nonaggregation is neither efficient nor fair. Nonetheless, that is exactly
what the Supreme Court mandated in both Clark and Zahn.
Court counseled against reliance on congressional silence in such circumstances. See
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
28 Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338. The plaintiffs argued in favor of extending the scope
of "matter in controversy" by claiming that the determination of whether claims are
separate and distinct breeds litigation and that the inability to aggregate small claims
prevents certain plaintiffs from litigating otherwise significant issues. Id.
29 Id. at 339-40; see also id. at 341 ("There is no compelling reason for this Court
to overturn a settled interpretation of an important congressional statute in order to
add to the burdens of an already overloaded federal court system.").
30 See generally Afshin Ashourzadeh, Comment, SupplementalJurisdictionin Class Action Lawsuits: RecoveringSupplementalJurisdictionfrom the Jaws ofAggregation, 26 Sw. U. L.
REv. 89, 127-29 (1996).
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In Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,3 1 several plaintiffs sued the California
Director of Motor V¢ehicles to enjoin the enforcement of the California Caravan Act, which imposed a license fee on automobiles driven
into the state for sale.3 2 Of the plaintiffs in Clark, only one independently satisfied the jurisdictional amount. The Court ruled that the
district court properly exercised jurisdiction over this plaintiff, but not
over the other plaintiffs in the action-even though each plaintiff's
complaint arose from the same underlying issue: namely, the alleged
33
constitutional infirmities of the Caravan Act.
Although the rule in Clark reduces the federal caseload, it does so
at the expense of fairness and efficiency. In cases like Clark, all the
claims arise from the same legal issue. Each claim shares essentially
the same facts. Injudge Easterbrook's words, to decide one plaintiff's
claim is to decide them all.3 4 Thus, neither private interests nor judicial economy are served by dismissing plaintiffs with jurisdictionally
insufficient claims in Clark-type scenarios.
Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.3 5 presented the same problem as
Clark, except the plaintiffs in Zahn were members of a Rule 23(b) (3)
class action. The named plaintiffs in Zahn satisfied the amount in controversy requirement, but the unnamed plaintiffs did not. All of the
plaintiffs in Zahn, though, shared the same complaint. Each owned or
leased land on Lake Champlain in Vermont. Each alleged that the
International Paper Company had fouled the shores of the lake by
releasing wood pulp from its New York paper mill into a tributary of
the lake.
The district court found that each of the four named plaintiffs
satisfied the then applicable $10,000 amount in controversy, but the
court was convinced to a legal certainty that all of the unnamed plaintiffs failed to state damages in excess of $10,000.36 The district court
dismissed the jurisdictionally insufficient claims of the unnamed
plaintiffs and refused to certify a class composed of the remaining
four plaintiffs. 37 The Second Circuit affirmed, 38 and the Supreme
Court upheld the Second Circuit.
31

306 U.S. 583 (1939).

32 Id. at 585-86. The plaintiffs argued that the license tax imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce and infringed upon the Due Process and

Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.
33 Id. at 590.
34 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 932
(7th Cir. 1996).
35 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
36 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971).
37 Id. at 434.
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Precedent Does Not Compel the Result in Zahn

The precedent relied upon by the Supreme Court in Zahn does
not support the Court's extension of § 1332's amount in controversy
requirement to each unnamed plaintiff. The majority inappropriately
relied on Snyderfor the proposition that "class actions involving plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims [are] subject to the usual rule
that a federal district court can assume jurisdiction over only those
plaintiffs presenting claims exceeding the [amount in controversy] .",9
The facts in Snyder were distinguishable from those in Zahn. None of
the plaintiffs in Snyder satisfied the amount in controversy requirement, and, consequently, the entire action failed for want ofjurisdiction. Zahn, however, involved a "mixed" diversity class action. The
district court already had jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs, whose
claims satisfied the amount in controversy, but not over the jurisdictionally insufficient claims of the unnamed plaintiffs. On its facts,
then, Snyder does not compel the conclusion that unnamed plaintiffs
must individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount when the class's
named representatives have met that amount.
The majority in Zahn also found Clark instructive; yet, the plaintiffs in Clarkwere not part of a class action, 40 and, consequently, there
were no unnamed plaintiffs in Clark. At best, Clark could be read as
requiring only the named plaintiffs in a class action to meet the
amount in controversy requirement. Clark, however, does not compel
a similar result for unnamed plaintiffs in a class action scenario. 4 1
Zahns requirement that unnamed plaintiffs satisfy the jurisdictional amount also seems inconsistent with the Court's decision in
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble.42 In Ben-Hur, the Court held that,
for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship in a class action,
only the citizenship of the named class representatives was relevant.
38 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
39 Zahn, 414 U.S. at 299.
40 Although the Supreme Court speaks of the plaintiffs in Clark as a class, Chief
Judge Leddy, the author of the district court opinion in Zahn, remarked that "[w]e
confess that we can find nothing in the official report of Clark clearly indicating that it
was, in fact, a class action." Zahn, 53 F.R.D. at 431. See also Lubomyr Carpiac, Note,
The Tower ofZahn Stands in Loose Sand. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 7 Loy. LA. L.
REv. 593, 602-03 (1974).
41 See generally Edward S. Ginsburg, Note, Unnamed Plaintiffs in Federal Class Actions: Zahn v. International Paper Co. FurtherRestricts the Availability of the Class Suit, 35
OHIO ST. LJ. 191, 203 (1974).
42 255 U.S. 356 (1921). See generally Brian Mattis &James S. Mitchell, The Trouble
with Zahn: Progeny ofSnyder v. Harris FurtherCripples ClassActions, 53 NnB. L. Ru. 137,
191-94 (1974).
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The rule in Ben-Hur is sensible. Without it, the complete diversity requirement would exclude many non-diverse plaintiffs in multi-state
class actions from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 43 A similar
rationale supports the relaxation of the amount in controversy requirement in diversity class actions. Many potential class action plaintiffs may not have damages in excess of the amount in controversy, but
refusing to exercise jurisdiction over them may prevent the plaintiffs
from forming a class at all.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Zahn ignored Ben-Hur and
imposed the burden of meeting the amount in controversy on each
and every diversity plaintiff. The Court offered no justification for relaxing the burdens of diversity in Ben-Hurwhile adhering so rigidly to
them in Zahn. Indeed, the Court never attempted to distinguish Ben44
Hur from Zahn.
b.

Zahn Is Inconsistent with Rule 23

Requiring unnamed plaintiffs to satisfy § 1332's amount in controversy also thwarts some of the chief functions of the class action
device. Among other things, the class action was designed to "reduce
units of litigation by bringing under one umbrella what might otherwise be many separate, but duplicating actions ... [and] to provide
means of vindicating the rights of groups of people who individually
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into
court at all." 45 Zahn hinders this two-fold goal by forbidding district
courts from exercising jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiffs with juris46
dictionally insufficient claims.
43 In fact, the district court in Zahn relied on Ben-Hur in rejecting International
Paper's attempt to have the plaintiffs residing in New York dismissed as non-diverse.
See Zahn, 53 F.R.D. at 430-31.
44 The two cases could be distinguished on the grounds that Ben-Hur involved a
true class action. Traditionally aggregation of claims was permitted for true class actions, while aggregation in spurious class actions, like Zahn, was never permitted. The
rule of Ben-Hur, however, has never been restricted to true class actions. See Mattis &
Mitchell, supra note 42, at 193 n.235.
45 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 497 (1969).
Professor Kaplan was the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules during
the revision of the class action device.
46 The rule in Zahn is arguably consistent with Rule 82's prohibition of using the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (including Rule 23) to "extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." FED. R. CIV.
P. 82. Some have argued, though, that Rule 82 ought to be read in light of Rule 1,
which articulates the interpretive framework for the Federal Rules. Rule 1 states that
the Federal Rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Crv. P. 1. Viewed in light of Rule
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The rule in Zahn thus presents three unsavory options for the
unnamed class action plaintiff with a jurisdictionally insufficient
claim. One option is to file an individual action in state court. The
fact that the unnamed plaintiff has failed to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, though, suggests that the plaintiffs legal bills
would more than outweigh his or her monetary damages. This is especially true where the defendant is a large corporation which can
afford drawn-out litigation and expensive expert testimony. The second option (if one can call it that) is to drop the suit altogether. This
implicitly encourages mass "nickel-and-dime" theft-especially from
consumers who have little economic incentive to pursue civil remedies.4 7 As a third option, the entire class could refile in state court.
This, however, is not likely to occur where the class action could proceed in federal court without the unnamed plaintiffs. Some states also
require class action plaintiffs to have minimum contacts with the
state,48 and where the injury suffered by the plaintiffs occurs in multiple states, this requirement erects a substantial barrier to maintaining
multi-state class actions in state court.
The rule in Zahn also poses inconsistencies for class plaintiffs
seeking equitable relief in the form of injunctions or declaratory judgments. In these instances, determining the amount in controversy becomes problematic. The Supreme Court has never addressed this
issue in the context of class actions, but in Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Commission,49 the Court ruled that, in suits seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, "the amount in controversy is measured by
the value of the object of the litigation."50 The Court did not specify
to whom the value of the equitable relief should be attributed, but
most courts have concluded that it should be attributed to either the
plaintiff or the defendant for purposes of determining the amount in
controversy. 5 1 Therefore, in class actions seeking injunctive relief, the
value of the injunction to the defendant would be adequate to secure
jurisdiction.
1, Rule 82 prohibits using the Federal Rules to expand jurisdiction only when the
expansion serves no efficiency-producing procedural purpose. Expanding jurisdiction to allow aggregation in class actions where the court already has jurisdiction over
the case furthers the goals of Rule 1 and, hence, does not violate Rule 82. See generally
Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of ProceduralRules on FederalJurisdiction,28 STAN. L.

REv. 395, 441-43 (1976); Patricia M. Noonan, Note, StatePersonalJurisdictionalRequirements and the Non-Aggregation Rule in Class Actions, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 445, 454.
47 See Ashourzadeh, supra note 30, at 127-28.
48 See Noonan, supra note 46, at 458-60.

49 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
50 Id. at 347-48.
51 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 5.3.4, at 291-92.
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So, if a group of plaintiffs with jurisdictionally insufficient claims
seeks injunctive relief under Rule 23(b) (1) or (b) (2), Zahn seems to
require each plaintiff to state a jurisdictionally sufficient interest in
the equitable relief. That is, the plaintiffs cannot aggregate their individual interest in equitable relief to meet the amount in controversy.
Strangely, though, Hunt permits jurisdiction over the very same plaintiffs when the defendant's interest in the equitable relief exceeds the
amount in controversy. Hunt seems to trump Zahn's non-aggregation
rule with respect to class actions seeking equitable relief.52 This,
though, begs another question. If aggregation is allowable for class
action plaintiffs seeking equitable relief, why should it also not be permitted for Rule 23(b) (3) class actions?
3.

Weighing the Virtues and Vices of Clark and Zahn

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of Clark and Zahn, the nonaggregation rule is not entirely withoutjustification. Non-aggregation
does reduce the managerial burdens placed upon federal courts by
multi-plaintiff litigation and by large diversity class actions. These burdens are often quite significant. Judicial economy is not served, however, by merely shifting the administrative burdens of multi-plaintiff
53
litigation from federal courts to already crowded state courts.
Relying on the rule in Zahn to solve the managerial problems of
"mixed" diversity class actions is inappropriate for another reason.
Federal courts already have the option under Rule 23 to dismiss a class
action if maintaining the action would impose inordinate managerial
burdens on the court.5 4 Denying class treatment pursuant to the stan52 Hunt trumps Zahn if the jurisdictional amount is calculated based on the value
of the injunction to the defendant. For example, an injunction ordering the defendant to cease polluting may only be worth several thousand dollars to any one plaintiff,
but it may be worth millions to the defendant. For this reason, Hunt may not supersede Zahn if the jurisdictional amount is calculated by determining the value of the
injunction to the plaintiff. Another alternative is possible. A court could ascertain
the jurisdictional amount by determining the worth of the injunction to the party
invoking federal jurisdiction. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 5.3.4, at 291-92 (citing McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1979); Thomas v.
General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (D. Ky. 1962)). Under this alternative, Hunt
would trump Zahn only when the defendant invokes federal jurisdiction by removing

a case from state court.
53 See generally John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARv. J. ON
LEGIs. 403, 405 (1979) (arguing that "there is no profit in transferring cases from one
logjam to another").
54 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) (D) (stating that, in determining whether to certify
a class, courts should consider "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action").
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dards provided by Rule 23 is more principled than dismissing class
members for failing to meet the Zahn Court's questionable formulation of § 1332's amount in controversy requirement.
The non-aggregation rule in Clark and Zahn also creates other
managerial headaches for courts and for litigants. Chiefly, it requires
the jurisdictionally insufficient plaintiffs to litigate common issues in
multiple state court suits. In addition to adding to state court congestion, this imposes upon the defendant the expensive and inconvenient burden of defending in multiple fora. Thus, the rule in Clark
and Zahn creates more managerial burdens than it alleviates.
Another justification for non-aggregation is its promotion of federalism. By requiring that jurisdictionally insufficient state law claims
be dismissed from federal court, the rule in Clark and Zahn, in theory,
permits state courts to resolve these state law issues. 55 In reality,
though, plaintiffs with jurisdictionally insufficient claims may have no
economic incentive to bring individual suits in state court. Furthermore, federalism is ill-served by diverting cases to state. courts which
56
already suffer from overcrowded dockets.

In sum, the non-aggregation rule articulated in Clark and Zahn
produces unfairness to litigants and hinders the efficient administration of multi-plaintiff litigation. These ill-effects more than outweigh
the possible benefits of Clark's and Zahn's application of the non-aggregation rule. An alternative exists, though, to the harsh consequences of the non-aggregation doctrine. Although the majorities in
neither Clark nor Zahn acknowledged it, ancillary jurisdiction over the
jurisdictionally insufficient plaintiffs was possible in each case. In his
dissent in Zahn,Justice Brennan advocated precisely this course of action. A discussion ofJustice Brennan's dissent and the history of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction follows.
B. Ancillary and PendentJurisdiction:Mitigatingthe HarshResults
of Non-Aggregation
1. Justice Brennan's Dissent in Zahn
Justice Brennan's dissent reflects his dissatisfaction with the majority's unthinking application of the non-aggregation doctrine. Brennan reminded the majority that "the 'aggregation' rule has been but
55 But see Frank, supra note 10, at 12 (questioning the premise that "there is such
a phenomenon as a 'state case,' a kind of provincial fracas which should be kept
happily local and free of federal contact").
56 See RIcHARD A.
(1996).
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one of several ways to establish jurisdiction over additional claims and
parties. '57 Indeed, he remarked that courts have long exercised ancillary jurisdiction over related claims that do not fit within the aggregation rules. 58 Judge Timbers' dissent in the Second Circuit also called
for recognition of
the well-established principle that if a case is properly in a federal
court, that court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case or
controversy in its entirety and therefore can adjudicate related
claims of ancillary parties who have no independent jurisdictional
grounds. 5 9

As Justice Brennan notes, the facts in Zahn particularly compelled the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the unnamed plaintiffs. The
class was composed of over 240 members, and the issues at stake required extensive use of expert testimony and scientific evidence.
Without ancillary jurisdiction, most of the unnamed plaintiffs could
not afford the expense of individual suits against International Paper
Company in state court. The unnamed plaintiffs' claims also arose
from the same facts and legal issues as those of the jurisdictionally
adequate named plaintiffs. Those of the unnamed plaintiffs who
could afford litigation likely would bring duplicative suits in state
court-thus creating preclusive or inconsistent judgments on the
same legal event. Either result, argued Justice Brennan, "will do no
60
judicial system credit."
2.

The Historical Development and Use of Ancillary and
Pendent Jurisdiction

As Justice Brennan noted, courts have used ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction as alternative means of gaining jurisdiction over related
claims and parties. 6 1 Ancillaryjurisdiction referred to the authority of
a federal court to hear jurisdictionally inadequate claims which arose
out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claims properly
before the court. 62 Courts implementing ancillary jurisdiction usually
employed it to cover additional parties and claims brought into the
57 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58 Id. (citing Wichita R.R & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48
(1922); Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450
(1861)).
59 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers,
J., dissenting).
60 Zahn, 414 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61 See generally Richard A. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary JurisdictionPrimer: The
Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction,17 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 103 (1983).
62 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 5.4, at 312.
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action under compulsory counterclaims, 63 cross-claims, 64 and impleader claims 65 against third-party defendants, even though these
parties and claims would not otherwise fulfill the requirements of federal jurisdiction. 66
67
Pendent jurisdiction is a subspecies of ancillary jurisdiction. It
refers to the exercise of federal jurisdiction over a state law claim or
claims (as well as the party or parties asserting those claims) which are
factually related to ajurisdictionally adequate claim already before the
court. In addition to promoting judicial efficiency and fairness to the
parties, pendent jurisdiction also avoided the complications arising
from preclusion of claims by duplicative judgments. 6
In exercising pendent jurisdiction over related claims, courts
struggled with the question ofjust how factually related the claims had
to be in order to justify the invocation of pendent jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court first tried to resolve this question in 1933. In Hum v.
Oursler69 the Court distinguished between state and federal claims
arising from a single "cause of action" and state and federal claims
arising from two separate causes of action. In the former situation,
the Court said that district courts could exercise jurisdiction over both
federal and state claims, but in the latter situation, where the federal
and state claims arose from "separate causes of action," the court had
jurisdiction only over the federal claim. 7 0 Courts found this test difficult to apply, primarily because the test's crucial term, "cause of ac71
tion," lacked substance and was difficult to define.
a.

72
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs

In Gibbs, the Supreme Court reformulated and clarified the Hum
test. The plaintiff in Gibbs sued the United Mine Workers in federal
court alleging violations of the Labor Management Relations Act.7 3
See FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a).
64 SeeFED. R. Cxv. P. 13 (g).
63

65 See FED. R. Crv. P. 14(a).
66 See CHEMERNSIxy, supra note 11, § 5.4, at 312-13; FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 15, § 2.12, at 66.
67 See CHEmERmNsKy, supra note 11, § 5.4, at 313.
68 But see Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent andAncillaryJurisdiction,1990
BYU L. REv. 247 (arguing that pendent and ancillary jurisdiction unconstitutionally
usurp state power).
69 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
70 Id. at 246.
71 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 15, § 2.12, at 70.
72 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
73 Gibbs arose out of a dispute between the United Mine Workers and the Southern Labor Union. The two unions clashed at a mine which Gibbs supervised. Due to

io6o

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 73:4

To this federal cause of action, Gibbs added a state-law tortious interference with contracts claim. The Supreme Court upheld the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction over both claims. Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, stated that courts have the power to exercise pendentjurisdiction whenever the relationship between the state law claim and the
federal claim "permits the conclusion that the entire action before the
court comprises but one constitutional 'case."' 74 In other words, pendent jurisdiction exists when the court has jurisdiction over the case
(either under § 1331 or § 1332) and the state-law claim "derive[s]
from a common nucleus of operative fact" such that both claims are
75
amenable to trial in one judicial proceeding.
Justice Brennan also noted that a court's power to exercise pendent jurisdiction was discretionary. He invited district courts to consider whether the exercise of pendentjurisdiction was justified in light
ofjudicial economy, fairness to the litigants, and principles of federalism. 76 He advised district courts to avoid exercising jurisdiction over
state law claims when the federal claims were dismissed or when state
77
law claims predominated in the suit.
b.

Limits on the Exercise of Ancillary and
Pendent Jurisdiction

The development of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction reflected
the judiciary's desire to avoid multiple suits over claims which could
be adjudicated in one action. This concern for judicial economy,
however, sometimes conflicted with the limitations placed on federal
jurisdiction by Congress. In two cases following Gibbs, the Supreme
Court outlined the boundaries of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction.
In Aldinger v. Howard,78 the Supreme Court upheld the district
court's refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a municipality in
the ensuing violence and disruption of work, Gibbs eventually lost hisjob. In his suit,
Gibbs alleged that the United Mine Workers had "blackballed" him from employment
at other mines in the region.
74 Id. at 725 (footnote omitted).

75

Id; see also FRIEDENTHAL

ET AL.,

supranote 15, § 2.12, at 70 ("If adjudication of

one of the claims normally would result in the application of resjudicata or collateral

estoppel with regard to any subsequent litigation of the other claim, then they are
claims that ordinarily would be tried in one judicial proceeding.") (footnote
omitted).

76 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725-26.
77 Id. at 726.
78 427 U.S. 1 (1976). The case began when Monica Aldinger was fired from her
secretarial position with Spokane County. She subsequently brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Merton Howard, the Spokane County Treasurer.
She later sought to append several related state claims against Spokane County itself.
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a § 1983 civil rights action against an officer of that municipality. At
79
the time, municipalities were not amenable to suit under § 1983,
and the Court remarked that allowing pendent jurisdiction over the
municipality "would run counter to the well-established principle that
federal courts ... are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by
Congress."80 The Court indicated that jurisdiction over a pendent
party, at a minimum, must be permissible under Article III of the Con8
stitution and must not have been precluded by congressional action. '
The Supreme Court spoke again on the limitations of ancillary
82
and pendent jurisdiction in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.
In Kroger, the Court refused to allow ancillary jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claims against a non-diverse, third-party defendant impleaded
under Rule 14(a) by the defendant.8 3 Since the plaintiff (Kroger)
would not have been permitted to sue the non-diverse, third-party defendant (Owen) originally, the Court reasoned that exercising ancillary jurisdiction over Kroger's amended complaint against the
84
impleaded Owen would "simply flout [a] Congressional command."
Because the county was neither amenable to suit under § 1983 nor a diverse party, the
district court ruled that it lacked an independent basis for pendent party jurisdiction
over the county and dismissed the state law claims against it.
79 The district court ruled that the county was not "suable as a 'person' under
§ 1983." Id. at 5; see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that city of Chicago was not liable in civil rights action for conduct of its police officers), overruled by
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
80 Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15.
81 Id. at 18.
82 437 U.S. 365 (1978). This case arose out ofJames Kroger's electrocution while
standing next to a steel crane which had accidentally touched a high tension electric
wire. His widow, an Iowa citizen, filed a wrongful death action in the District of Nebraska against the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), a Nebraska corporation.
Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and the requisite amount in
controversy was met. After the filing of the complaint, OPPD impleaded the operator
of the crane, Owen Equipment and Erection Company (Owen), under Rule 14(a).
Kroger then amended her complaint to include Owen. Later in the case, it was discovered that Owen's principal place of business was in Iowa, thus placing Iowa citizens
on both sides of the dispute and violating § 1332's requirement of complete diversity
of citizenship.
83 Id. at 367-68. Rule 14(a) provides, in relevant part, "At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a
summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is
or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff." FED R. Civ. P. 14(a).
84 Kroger, 437 U.S. at 377 (footnote omitted); see also id. (stating that "neither the
convenience of litigants nor considerations ofjudicia economy can suffice to justify
extension of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiff's cause of action
against a citizen of the same State in a diversity case").
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Such a result would only encourage future plaintiffs to first sue diverse
parties and then wait for those parties to implead the "real" parties to
85
the suit-the non-diverse, third-party defendants.
Even after Aldinger and Kroger, the limits placed upon ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction were fairly broad. Courts could exercise ancillary and pendent jurisdiction over parties and claims which arose
from the "common nucleus of operative fact" of the claim properly
before the federal court. Courts could not exercise ancillary and pendent jurisdiction over claims and parties when doing so would be contrary to a federal statute (as in Aldinger) or when it would violate the
rule of complete diversity of citizenship (as in Kroger).
C. Ancillary and PendentJurisdiction: An Efficient and FairAlternative
to Non-Aggregation
There is, then, a tension inherent in the parallel development of
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, on the one hand, and the nonaggregation rule on the other.8 6 The Supreme Court has struggled to
harmonize congressional limitations on federal court jurisdiction with
the exercise of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. The Court's decisions in Gibbs, Aldinger, and Kroger strike a sensible balance between
these competing policy goals. The Court's application of the non-aggregation doctrine in Clark and Zahn, however, erects unjustified barriers to federal jurisdiction. As such, Clark and Zahn must go, and
§ 1367 provides the perfect vehicle with which to wipe them from the
87
books.

85 Professor Richard Freer argues, though, that the Court's strict prohibition of
ancillary jurisdiction over impleaded third-party defendants was unnecessary in light
of 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994), which prohibits federal jurisdiction over parties improperly or collusively joined. Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering
Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445,

459, 480 (1991).
86 See generallyWilliam H. Theis, Zahn v. International Paper Co.: The Non-Aggregation Rule in JurisdictionalAmount Cases, 35 LA. L. REV. 89, 94 (1974).
87 See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond the Class Action Rule: An Inventory of
Statutory Possibilitiesto Improve the Federal ClassAction, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 186, 194 (1996)

("Zahn... is high on a list of candidates to be overruled, but the Supreme Court
seems most unlikely to overrule the decision on the merits. Congress may have done
so unintentionally in the 1990 supplemental-jurisdiction statute ....").
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Finley and the Need for a SupplementalJurisdictionStatute

The Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States8 8 provided
the motive force behind the enactment of § 1367. The Supreme

Court granted certiorari in Finley ostensibly to resolve a split among
the circuits over whether the Federal Tort Claims Act permitted pen-

dentjurisdiction over additional parties.8 9 The Court held that it did
not.90 The result was less shocking than the overall implications that
the Court's opinion posed for ancillary and pendent jurisdiction.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia turned Aldinger's and Kroger's presumption in favor of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction (in the absence of congressional prohibition) on its head. Instead, Scalia
asserted that the Court "will not assume that the full constitutional
power [to add pendent parties] has been congressionally authorized,
and [the Court] will not read jurisdictional statutes broadly."91 Hereafter, the exercise of pendent jurisdiction would be presumed impermissible, unless the statute governing the federal claim expressly

authorized

it.

9

2

88 490 U.S. 545 (1989). The plaintiff's husband and children were killed when
their twin-engine plane clipped electric transmission lines and crashed near a San
Diego airfield. She subsequently brought state tort claims against both the San Diego
Gas and Electric Company, for negligent positioning and illumination of the transmission lines, and the city of San Diego, for negligent maintenance of the airfield's
runway lights. Some time after initiating the state court action, Mrs. Finley, a California resident, learned that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was actually the
party responsible for maintaining the runway lights. She then filed a separate suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the FAA in federal district court.
Nearly a year after bringing the federal suit, she sought to amend her federal complaint to include the state law claims against the original non-diverse defendants, San
Diego Gas and the city of San Diego. The district court granted her motion to amend
and exercised pendent jurisdiction over the parties to the original state action. The
original defendants sought an interlocutory appeal of the court's ruling. The Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court, stating that pendent jurisdiction was impermissible
under the FTCA.
89 Id. at 547.
90 Id. at 553 (arguing that "[t]he statute here defines jurisdiction in a manner
that does not reach defendants other than the United States") (footnote omitted).
91 Id. at 549.
92 In dicta, the Court reluctantly affirmed the use of pendent claim jurisdiction
out of respect for stare decisis:
As we noted at the outset, our cases do not display an entirely consistent
approach with respect to the necessity that jurisdiction be explicitly conferred. The Gibbs line of cases was a departure from prior practice, and a
departure that we have no intent to limit or impair. But Aldinger indicated
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The Court's insistence on explicit congressional authorization for
pendent party jurisdiction seemed to jeopardize the continued validity
of ancillary jurisdiction as well. Congress, after all, never explicitly authorized this form of jurisdiction. 93 The opinion also was troublesome because it conflicted with the general policy goals of ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction-namely, fairness to the litigants and judicial economy. Plaintiffs asserting federal and state claims against multiple parties would now be forced to abandon their right to litigate in
a federal forum or, alternatively, endure the expense and possibly
prejudicial effects of litigating some claims in state court and others in
federal court. 94 Moreover, this threat to ancillary and pendentjurisdiction clashed with the underlying goals of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: the elimination of procedural barriers to the joinder of
related claims and parties in order to effectuate the efficient resolu95
tion of all claims in a single case.
Justice Scalia recognized, though, that Congress could legislatively overrule the majority's decision. 96 Congress did just that with
the passage of the Judicial Improvements Act 97 little over a year after
the Finley opinion. 98 The Act included a supplemental jurisdiction
statute which "essentially restor[ed] the pre-Finley understandings on
that the Gibbs approach would not be extended to the pendent-party field,
and we decide today to retain that line.
Id. at 556; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 28 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6860, 6874 (stating that in Finley, "the Supreme Court cast substantial doubt on the
authority of the federal courts to hear some claims within supplemental jurisdiction").
93 Congress did authorize ancillary and pendent jurisdiction over related state
unfair competition claims arising in federal patent, trademark, and copyright actions.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1994).
94 Plaintiffs can always choose to litigate both the federal and state claims in state
court, unless, as in Finey, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the federal claim.
95 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 ("Under the Rules,
the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent
with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties, and remedies is strongly encouraged.") (footnote omitted).
96 Justice Scalia noted in Finley that, "Whatever we say regarding the scope of
jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress."
Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
97 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. This was an omnibus bill with provisions
ranging from federal court reform to television violence. The portions of the Act
relevant to the supplemental jurisdiction statute are found at Title III, § 310, 104 Stat.
5113.
98 See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,
6874 ("Legislation... is needed to provide the federal courts with statutory authority
to hear supplemental claims. Indeed, the Supreme Court has virtually invited Congress to codify supplemental jurisdiction .... .").
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the authorization for and limits on other forms of supplemental jurisdiction." 99 According to the House Judiciary Committee's report, the
supplemental jurisdiction statute was designed to prevent the
Supreme Court's holding in Finley from ending the formerly routine
exercise of pendent and ancillaryjurisdiction. 10 0 The Committee also
reported that § 1367(b) codified the result in Kroger by forbidding
plaintiffs from evading the requirement of complete diversity by initially naming defendants who satisfy § 1332's diversity requirements
and later adding claims against impleaded, non-diverse third-party
defendants.' 0 '
Congress passed § 1367 "with admirable dispatch" in the last days
of the 1990 Session. 10 2 On its face, the statute overrules Clark's and
Zahn's application of the non-aggregation doctrine to multi-plaintiff
diversity actions. While this is a welcome result for reasons already
stated, the legislative history of § 1367 indicates that Congress may not
have intended § 1367 to overrule either case. The resulting ambiguity
has generated a great deal of vigorous commentary'0 3 as well as considerable judicial confusion.
B.

The District Courts

Most district courts which have addressed § 1367's application to
multi-plaintiff diversity actions have done so in the context of class
actions. The majority of these courts have ruled that § 1367 does not
overrule Zahn.'0 4 In reaching this conclusion, many of these courts
99 Id.
100 Id. (noting that "[a]lready ... some lower courts have interpreted Finley to
prohibit the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in formerly unquestioned circumstances") (footnote omitted).
101 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994).
102 Thomas M. Mengler et al., CongressAccepts the Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify
SupplementalJurisdiction,74 JuDicA-rua 213, 213 (1991).
103 See generallyThomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Graspingat Burnt Straws: The
Disasterof the SupplementalJurisdictionStatute, 40 EMoRY L.J. 963 (1991); Freer, supra
note 85; Thomas D. Rowe,Jr. et al., Compoundingor CreatingConfusion about SupplementalJurisdiction? A Reply to ProfessorFreer,40 EMORY L.J. 943 (1991).
104 See, e.g., Russ v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 808, 820 (E.D. Pa.
1997); McGowan v. Cadbury Schweppes, PLC, 941 F. Supp. 344, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Bernard v. Gerber Food Prods. Co., 938 F. Supp. 218, 223-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Snider
v. Stimson Lumber Co., 914 F. Supp. 388, 389-92 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Benninghoff v.
Tolson, No. 94-CV-2903, 1994 WL 111355 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1994); Riverside Transp.,
Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 847 F. Supp. 453, 455-56 (M.D. La. 1994);
Bennfield v. Mocatta Metals Corp., No. 91 Civ. 8255, 1993 WL 148978 (S.D.N.Y. May
5, 1993); Mayo v. Key Fin. Servs., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 277, 278 (D. Mass. 1993); Averdick
v. Republic Fin. Servs., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 37, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1992); Bradbury v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., No. 92-C3408, 1992 WL 178648 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 1992).
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have relied on the legislative history of § 1367 to support their argument. Specifically, these courts rely on a passage in the House Judiciary Committee Report which indicates an intent to preserve Zahn. 0 5
A minority of district courts have refused to consider the legislative history of § 1367. Those courts have narrowed their focus to the
face of the statute and, consequently, have concluded that § 1367
trumps the aggregation rules in Zahn.10 6 The two circuit courts which
have ruled on this issue 10 7 also have refused to consult § 1367's legislative history. An analysis of the Fifth and Seventh Circuit decisions
follows.
08
C. In re Abbott Laboratories

In October of 1993, Robin and Renee Free and a putative class 0 9
of similarly situated unnamed plaintiffs filed a state antitrust class action in Louisiana state court. The complaint alleged that Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Meyers Squib Company, and the Mead Johnson &
Company had conspired to fix the price of infant formula. On the
basis of diversity of citizenship, the defendants removed the action to
federal court. The district court determined that each named and
unnamed plaintiff in the class action alleged only $20,000 in damages-far short of the $50,000 amount in controversy required at that
time to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction. The district court
found, however, that Louisiana law attributed the attorney's fees of
state antitrust class action plaintiffs to the class's named representa105 H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875
& n.17 (stating that § 1367 "is not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley") (citing Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973);
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1929)); see infta discussion accompanying note 135.
106 See, e.g., Booty v. Shoney's, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1524, 1526-27 (E.D. La. 1995);
Lindsay v. Kvortek, 865 F. Supp. 264, 272-76 (W.D. Pa. 1994); Patterson Enters., Inc.
v. Bridgestone/ Firestone, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1152, 1154-55 (D. Kan. 1993); Garza v.
National Am. Ins. Co., 807 F. Supp. 1256, 1257-58 (M.D. La. 1992).
107 The Third Circuit noted § 1367's potential to abrogate Zahn, but the court did
not decide the issue. See Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 n.9 (3d
Cir. 1993). Before Stromberg, the Seventh Circuit also addressed this issue without
deciding it. See Anthony v. Security Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 75 F.3d 311, 315-16 & n.2
(7th Cir. 1996).
108 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
109 When the case reached the Fifth Circuit, the district court had not yet certified
a class. Nonetheless, I will refer to the plaintiffs as classmembers, rather than "putative classmembers" for purposes of this discussion.
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rives. 110 With these attorney's fees, the Free's complaint alleged damages well in excess of the $50,000 amount in controversy. The
unnamed plaintiffs, however, lacked the requisite amount in controversy, and the district court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdicdon over them."' The district court then granted the Free's motion
to remand to state court.
On appeal from the remand order, Judge Higginbotham acknowledged that the rule in Zahn prohibits jurisdiction over unnamed
plaintiffs in a diversity class action who fail to satisfy § 1332's amount
in controversy. He noted, though, that on its face § 1367 appears to
overrule Zahn. He remarked that "[s]upplemental jurisdiction over
the unnamed plaintiffs' claims has been an open question since Congress passed the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990."112 Like some
district judges, Judge Higginbotham acknowledged that a portion of
§ 1367's legislative history suggests that Congress did not intend to
overrule Zahn. He also noted that the omission of Rule 23 from
§ 1367(b)'s exceptions to supplemental jurisdiction might have been
a clerical error. 113 Nonetheless, he refused to consult the legislative
history to determine whether Congress intended the omission. Relying on the "plain-meaning" canon of statutory interpretation, he argued that "the statute is the sole repository of congressional intent
' 4
where the statute is clear and does not demand an absurd result.""
He found the provisions of § 1367 to be clear, and he refused to second guess the wisdom of the statute." 5 He also refused to characterize the abrogation of Zahn as an absurd result," 6 but he did not
explain why overruling Zahn was a sensible or, at least, an acceptable
result.
After concluding this somewhat cursory textual analysis of § 1367,
Judge Higginbotham, on behalf of a unanimous panel, ruled that
"under § 1367 a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over members of a class, although they did not meet the amount-incontroversy requirement."' 1 7 Thus, the Fifth Circuit became the first
110 See Abbott, 51 F.3d at 526-27.
111 See id.
at 527.
112 Id. (footnote omitted).
113 Id. at 528.
114 Id. at 529 (citing West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99-100
(1991)). But see Recent Case, 109 HAuv. L. RFv. 858 (1996) (arguing that the textualist interpretation of § 1367 in Abbott thwarts clearly expressed congressional intent not
to overrule Zahn).
115 Abbott, 51 F.3d at 529 (arguing that "the wisdom of the statute is not our affair
beyond determining that overturning Zahn is not absurd").
116 Id.
117

Id.
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circuit court to acknowledge Zahn's demise. While this is the right
result, the Fifth Circuit's opinion left much to be desired. The court's
refusal to address § 1367's legislative history has prompted some to
argue that the court's rigid textualism "usurps the lawmaking author118
ity of Congress... to defeat a clearly expressed legislative intent."
Moreover, the opinion offers nothing new to the debate over Zahns
viability. The case for and against a "plain-meaning" approach to
§ 1367 already has been thoroughly articulated in the district courts
and in the law reviews. 1 19 No court, however, has reevaluated the merits of Zahn in light of § 1367. Judge Higginbotham passed up an opportunity to bolster his textualist reading of § 1367 with a substantive
analysis of Zahn's incompatibility with Congress's stated and unstated
intentions in passing § 1367.
D.

1 20
Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical,Inc.

Stromberg presented the Seventh Circuit with virtually the same
question, but in a slightly different format. The plaintiffs in Stromberg
were not members of a putative class; rather, they were joint plaintiffs
in a suit against a common defendant. The plaintiffs, Stromberg
Metal Works, Inc. and Comfort Control, Inc., were Maryland subcontractors who were hired by Press Mechanical (an Illinois contractor)
to install heating and air-conditioning at Maryland's Calvert Cliffs nuclear power station. 12 1 Bechtel Power Corporation (the contracting
agent for the power plant) agreed to reimburse Press for work done
by the subcontractors, but only after Press had certified that it had
paid them.1 22 Press falsely certified to Bechtel that it had paid
Stromberg and Comfort Control when, in fact, Press had pocketed the
money. After Stromberg and Comfort Control had completed the
work, Press became insolvent. As a result, neither Stromberg nor
118 See Recent Case, supra note 114, at 858.
119 See supranotes 104 & 106. See generally Laura L. Hirschfeld, The $50,000 Question: Does SupplementalJurisdictionExtend to Claims Between Diverse Parties Which Do Not
Meet § 1332's Amount-in-Controversy Requirement?, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 107, 117-21 (1995);
Heather McDaniel, Comment, Pluggingthe GapingHole: The Effect of 28 U.S. C. § 1367
on the Complete Diversity Requirement of 28 US.C. § 1332,49 BAYLOR L. REV. 1069 (1997);
Christopher P. Simkins, Note, Class Actions and SupplementalJurisdiction: Will Zahn v.
International Paper Co. Remain Viable?, 1996 BYU L. REv. 707; Joel E. Tasca, Comment, JudicialInterpretationof the Effect of the SupplementalJurisdictionStatute on the Complete Amount in Controversy Rule: A Case for Plain Meaning Statutory Construction, 46
EMORY L.J. 435 (1997).

120
121
122

77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 929.
Id. at 930.
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Comfort Control received any compensation from Press. Bechtel also
refused to pay Stromberg and Comfort Control since it had already
123
paid Press for their work.
Stromberg and Comfort Control subsequently filed a diversity action in the Northern District of Illinois to pierce the corporate veil
and recover compensation from the controllers of the defunct Press
Mechanical. 124 Stromberg's claim against the corporate controllers
exceeded the $50,000 amount in controversy, but Comfort Control's
claim did not. 25 Consequently, the district court refused to exercise
26
jurisdiction over Comfort Control.'
On appeal, Judge Easterbrook framed the issue as whether "the
supplemental jurisdiction [statute] permit[s] a court to hear a claim
27
by a party whose loss does not meet the jurisdictional minimum[.]"1
In dicta, Judge Easterbrook agreed with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion
that § 1367 overrules Zahn.12 8 Easterbrook acknowledged that portions of § 1367's legislative history militate against this conclusion,
but, relying on a plain-meaning interpretation of the statute, Easterbrook concluded that "when text and legislative history disagree, the
129
text controls."'
The rationale of Abbott Laboratories, however, did not compel a
similar outcome in Strombergbecause the Stromberg plaintiffs were not
members of a class. They were Rule 20 co-plaintiffs. On this basis, the
Seventh Circuit was asked to distinguish the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Abbott Laboratories.'30 Judge Easterbrook refused, acknowledging that
§ 1367 does not exclude Rule 20 plaintiffs from the statute's grant of
supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367(a). Consequently, he argued,
§ 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 20 permissive
plaintiffs even when they do not satisfy the amount in controversy. As
3
a result, § 1367 also abrogates the Supreme Court's ruling in Clark.' '
Recognizing this, Easterbrook remarked that "[s]ection 1367(a) has
123

Id.

124 Id.
125 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., No. 94-C6753, 1995
WL 387812, at * 1 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 1995).
126 Id. The district court exercised jurisdiction over Stromberg's action, but dismissed it for failure to state a claim. Id. at *4.
127 Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 930.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 931 (citation omitted). For a more detailed articulation ofJudge Easterbrook's theory of statutory interpretation, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HAxv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994).

130

Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 931.

131

Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
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changed the basic rule by authorizing pendent-party jurisdiction, and
32
that change affects Clark and Zahn equally.'
Judge Easterbrook's opinion rests squarely on a "plain-meaning"
interpretation of § 1367. In dicta, though, Easterbrook hinted that
judicial economy also supports the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the jurisdictionally insufficient claim of Comfort Control.
He noted that
[t]his strikes us as exactly the sort of case in which pendent-party
jurisdiction is appropriate. It is two for the price of one: to decide
either plaintiff's claim is to decide both, and neither private interests nor judicial economy would be promoted by resolving
Stromberg's claim in federal court while trundling Comfort Control
133
off to state court to get a second opinion.
Unfortunately, he offered textualism, rather than economy and fairness, as the primary justification for the abrogation of Clark and Zahn.
Something more than a canon of statutory interpretation is needed to
justify this result.
IV.

JUSTIFYING THE RESULT IN ABBOTT LABORA TORES AND

STROMBERG Mixz WoRRs

A.

The Right Result, For the Wrong Reasons

Plain-meaning provides merely the occasion for overruling Clark
and Zahn. It does not provide a compelling justification for that result-especially in light of legislative history indicating an intent to
preserve Zahn. Policy and precedent, however, do provide substantial
support for § 1367's abrogation of Clark and Zahn. As an initial matter, § 1367 endorses the Supreme Court's attempts to facilitate the
efficient packaging of related claims through the exercise of ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction. Indeed, the statute elevates efficiency over
the Court's formalistic articulations of the amount in controversy requirement in Clark and Zahn. This is a welcome result. The statute
grants courts the discretion to resolve claims (including those of Rule
20 and Rule 23 plaintiffs) which otherwise would have to be dismissed
for failing to meet an essentially arbitrary jurisdictional amount. In
doing so, § 1367 allows the federal judiciary to efficiently and fairly
resolve complex, multi-party lawsuits.
By liberalizing supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 20 and Rule
23 plaintiffs, § 1367 reduces the likelihood of concurrent litigation in
federal and state courts over the same legal issues. Courts can now
132
133

Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 931.
Id. at 932.
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bundle related claims for trial in one suit, thereby reducing the danger of duplicative and contradictory judgments in state court. This
also has the effect of allowing plaintiffs, who have significant injuries
butjurisdictionally insufficient damages, to aggregate their claims and
sue as a group. This enables plaintiffs, especially injured consumers,
to redress penny-ante mass theft. Defendants also will welcome
§ 1367's abrogation of Clark and Zahn. Because the statute furthers
the resolution of multiple claims in one suit, it permits a party to
mount a defense in a single federal forum rather than in multiple
state and federal trial courts which may be governed by disparate laws
and procedures.
For these same reasons, § 1367's abrogation of Zahn furthers the
formation and resolution of federal class actions under Rule 23. Addi3 4 By
tionally, the statute is consistent with the rationale in Ben-Hur.1
eliminating Zahn's requirement that unnamed plaintiffs individually
satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, § 1367 places the burden of meeting the jurisdictional amount only on the named
plaintiffs.
In addition to policy and precedent, the outcome of Abbott Laboratoriesand StrombergMetalWorks is justified also because it is consistent
with congressional intent. This is a novel argument. Courts and commentators who have examined § 1367's legislative history have concluded that Congress never intended to overrule Zahn, much less
Clark. Their conclusions rest primarily on a footnote in the House
Judiciary Committee's report on the proposed supplemental jurisdicdion statute. Citing Zahn, the Committee asserted that § 1367 "is not
intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332
in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted
prior to Finley."135 Relying on this footnote as indicative of congressional intent, however, is a mistake. Ignoring it (as the Fifth and Seventh Circuits did) solely because it conflicts with the "plain-meaning"
canon of statutory interpretation is equally foolish. There is considerable evidence in the legislative history which minimizes the persuasiveness of the Judiciary Committee's footnote. Had Judges
Higginbotham and Easterbrook addressed this legislative history, they
would have discovered that Congress could not rationally have intended to preserve Zahn or Clark.

134 See supra text accompanying notes 42 & 43.
135 H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 6860, 6875
& n.17 (citing Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Supreme Tribe
of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1929)).
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In order to understand why the Committee's footnote is anomalous, it is necessary to examine the context in which § 1367 was
drafted. A careful contextual study of § 1367's history reveals that the
Judiciary Committee may not have carefully considered the ill-effects
of Zahn. Moreover, the context of § 1367's development suggests that
Congress intended to eradicate the very problems created by Clark
and Zahn.
B.

The Federal Courts Study Committee Report

The parameters of the supplemental jurisdiction statute were first
proposed by the Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSC).136 Congress established the FCSC to conduct an "institutional" study of the
problems facing the federal judiciary and to recommend solutions to
these problems by April 2, 1990.137 Congress specifically charged the
FCSC to address the increase in federal court congestion that has "result[ed] in a concomitant decline in access to justice in both our civil
and criminal courts." 138 After its 15 month study of the problems facing the federal judiciary, the FCSC issued a report containing a broad
range of suggestions to eliminate federal court congestion, delay, and
expense. One of these suggestions was the enactment of a supplemental jurisdiction statute which would codify the pre-Finley boundaries of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. Significantly, the FCSC
13 9
recommended that the statute overrule Zahn.
Unfortunately, the Report's anti-diversity slant clouds its proposals for the codification of supplemental jurisdiction. The Report's
recommendation to statutorily overrule Zahn was overshadowed by its
1 40
more radical proposal to abolish diversity jurisdiction altogether.
136

FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COM-

MITrEE (1990) [hereinafter FCSC REPORT].

137 See The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§§ 102(b) (1)-(3), 105 (1)-(4), 102 Stat. 4642, 4644, 4645 (1988) (charging the FCSC
to "examine the problems and issues currently facing the courts of the United States"

and to "develop a long-range plan for the future of the Federal judiciary").
138 H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,
6861-62.
139

See infra text accompanying note 155.

140

FCSC REPORT, supra note 136, pt. I, at 14-15, pt. II, 38-42 (the FCSC made

exceptions for interpleader suits, suits by and against citizens of foreign countries,

and for multi-state complex litigation). For an explanation of why the FCSC may have
made an exception for complex multi-state litigation, see Hirschfeld, supra note 119,

at 129 (noting that federal jurisdiction eliminates difficulties posed by in personam
jurisdiction to large class actions, reduces repetitive litigation, and encourages uni-

form rulings).
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Indeed, the FCSC branded diversity jurisdiction as one of the chief
causes of federal court congestion.
The FCSC's animosity toward diversity stems from the inordinate
burdens placed upon federal courts by plaintiffs invoking diversity jurisdiction. According to the Report, diversity cases accounted for almost one of every four cases in district court, one of every two civil
trials, and one of every ten appeals.1 4 1 This, it argued, prevented the
speedy adjudication of rights and limited the amount of time judges
could devote to individual cases. The FCSC also suggested that many
of the policy justifications originally supporting the existence of diver42
sityjurisdiction no longer exist.'
Although the FCSC regarded the abolition of diversity jurisdiction as the best way to reduce federal court congestion, it realized that
Congress would balk at taking such a radical step.143 Contrary to the
FCSC Report, there are still significant policy justifications for diversityjurisdiction. Chief among them is the fact that in certain cases (as
in Clark or Zahn-type scenarios) diversity jurisdiction furthers, rather
than hinders, judicial economy. 44 Diversity jurisdiction also provides
a "social service" by granting a federal forum to litigants who would
otherwise have to endure litigation in more congested state courts. 145
Furthermore, diversity "evens the playing field" by providing a uniform set of procedural rules for in-state and out-of-state attorneys. 146
Because of likely congressional reticence, the FCSC proposed a
"back-up" plan.' 4 7 This secondary option contained four proposals.

First, Congress should prohibit plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction in their home states.' 48 Second, Congress should deem corporations citizens of every state in which they are licensed to do
business.' 49 Currently, corporations, for purposes ofjurisdiction, are
deemed citizens of the state of their incorporation and of the state (or
141 FCSC REPORT, supra note 136, pt. iI, at 38-39.
142 Id., pt. II, at 39 (stating that "no other class of cases has a weaker claim on
federal judicial resources").
143 Three previous efforts to abolish diversity jurisdiction foundered in Congress.
See H.R. 9622, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 130, 2202, 96th Cong. (1979).
144 See generally Adrienne J. Marsh, DiversityJurisdiction:Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BRooL L. REv. 197 (1982).
145 See Frank, supranote 53, at 406 (referring to diversityjurisdiction as "the oldest
single federal social service").
146 See David L. Shapiro, FederalDiversityJurisdiction:A Survey and Proposal 91 HAuv.
L. REv. 317, 329 (1977).
147 FCSC REPORT, supra note 136, pt. II, at 42.
148 See id.
149 See id.
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states) of their principal place of business. 150 The same rationale for
prohibiting in-state plaintiffs from invoking diversity applies here:
multi-state corporations, which employ the local populace, can hardly
complain of a particularly local bias when they are sued in state court.
The FCSC's last two proposals erect obstacles to invoking diversity
jurisdiction by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to reach the jurisdictional amount in controversy. The Report recommended that
Congress exclude non-economic damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees from the calculation of the jurisdictional amount. 15 1
Thus, only actual damages would count toward satisfying the jurisdiction amount. Finally, the FCSC suggested that Congress raise the
amount in controversy requirement from $50,000 to $75,000.152
Taken as a whole, the FCSC's findings and proposals reveal two
indisputable facts about its assessment of the problems besetting the
federal judiciary. First, thanks to diversity jurisdiction, the federal
courts are overly congested with state law causes of action. Second,
federal judicial resources are being used inefficiently. This second assessment of the state of the federal judiciary best explains the FCSC's
proposal to codify the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction.
The FCSC realized that adjudicating multiple claims in one suit is far
preferable to multiplying litigation by hampering the judiciary's ability to exercise ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
FCSC recommended that Congress overrule Finley and codify the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction in a supplemental jurisdic153
tion statute.
The FCSC acknowledged that eliminating ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction might further its goal of reducing the number of claims in
federal court. Nonetheless, it found that the benefits of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction more than compensated for the burden that supplemental claims impose upon the federal courts. The FCSC advocated a rule which would restore the law as it existed before Finley. In
other words, the FCSC urged Congress to adopt a statute which permitted the joinder of additional parties and which codified the Gibbs
"common nucleus of operative fact" standard as the basis for federal
15 4
jurisdiction over related claims and parties.
150 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994).
151 FCSC REPORT, supra note 136, pt. II, at 42.
152 Id.
153 Id., pt. II, at 47; see also id., pt. III, at 547 ("By undermining these doctrines the
Supreme Court has impeded the efficient use of judicial resources and made the
federal courts a less attractive forum in which to bring federal claims.").
154 Id., pt. II, at 47.
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Moreover, the FCSC recommended that the supplemental jurisdiction statute overrule the non-aggregation doctrine in Zahn. The
Report stated that
[o]ur proposal would overrule the Supreme Court's decision in
Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., which held that each plaintiff in a

diversity action must meet the amount incontroversy requirement.
Although Zahn did not discuss pendent jurisdiction, the lower
courts have correctly understood it to preclude thejoinder of claims
for less than the requisite amount in controversy to a claim that
satisfies the requirement ....

From a policy standpoint this decision

55
makes little sense and we recommend that Congress overrule it.'
One commentator has suggested that this statement is anomalous and
that it was meant to apply only if Congress abolished diversity jurisdiction entirely. 156 The FCSC, though, had good reason to advocate
Zahn' demise whether Congress abolished diversity jurisdiction or
not. By forcing each plaintiff in a class action (or in a multi-plaintiff
suit) to meet the amount in controversy requirement, Zahn splinters a
single action into countless fragments-creating multiple suits, preclusion problems, and injustice to diversity plaintiffs with valid but jurisdictionally insufficient claims.
After the FCSC issued its Report, Representative Robert Kastenmeier introduced House Bill 5381, which implemented many of
the FCSC's proposals. Representative Kastenmeier, who had previously introduced legislation to abolish diversity jurisdiction, also conducted a public hearing on the FCSC's proposals. 157 The antidiversity tenor of the FCSC Report, as well as Representative Kastenmeier's well-documented anti-diversity bias, may have clouded the
Judiciary Committee's views on Zahn. The Committee (as well as the
Congress as a whole) also may not have had time to carefully consider
the implications of retaining Zahn. The supplemental jurisdiction
statute (which was drafted by three law professors)15 8 was hurried

155

Id., pt. III, at 561 n.33.

156 See Hirschfeld, supra note 119, at 132-33 (arguing that if diversity jurisdiction
were elimihated, requiring each plaintiff in a multi-plaintiff action to meet the
amount in controversy requirement would be "overkill" since the number of diversity
plaintiffs in federal court already would have been reduced to a trickle).
157 See H.R. 2202, 96th Cong. (1978). House Bill 2202 was sponsored by Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wisc.) who, as chair of the Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice, conducted public hearings
on the FCSC Report. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 15-16 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA-N. 6860, 6861.
158 See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 27 n.13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6860, 6873 (thanking "Professors Thomas Mengler, Thomas Rowe, [and] Stephen
Burbank" for their assistance).
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through Congress in the last days of the 1989-90 Session and never
debated in either chamber. 159
These facts suggest, then, that an anti-diversity bias combined
with a busy legislative calendar prevented Congress from carefully
considering the unfairness and inefficiencies produced by Zahn and
so may have led to the Committee's now infamous footnote. It is
clear, though, that Congress intended to codify supplemental jurisdiction in order "to deal economically-in single rather than multiple litigation-with related matters ... arising from the same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences."1 6 0 This intent to
further judicial economy is simply inconsistent with the Judiciary
Committee's purported desire to preserve Zahn.
C.

Conclusion

136 7 's

In failing to address §
legislative history, as well as the policy and precedent which support the demise Clark and Zahn, the Fifth
and Seventh Circuit opinions offer an inadequate justification for
§ 1367's abrogation of Clark and Zahn. The Fifth and Seventh Circuit
decisions rise and fall on the textualism of Judges Higginbotham and
Easterbrook. Lower courts and other Circuit Courts of Appeals who
disagree with the "plain-meaning" canon of statutory interpretation
have no compelling reason to accept the holdings of Abbott Laboratories
and Stromberg Metal Works.
This is unfortunate. Congress may not have thought carefully
about § 1367's effect on Clark and Zahn, but, if it had, it might well
have advocated the abrogation of those decisions. Clark and Zahn
both produce inefficiencies that clutter the federal and state courts
with duplicative litigation. Moreover, both cases hamper the efficient
resolution of complex lawsuits. As such, Clark and Zahn are inconsistent with Congress's laudable desire to reduce court congestion and
improve access to federaljurisdiction. A stray footnote to the contrary
should not cast doubt on the incompatibility of Clark and Zahn with
that desire.
Mark C. Cawley*
159

See Freer, supra note 85, at 470-71 (noting that § 1367 "came to a vote in the

last days of the 1990 session, when [Congress] was waging the very public battle of the
budget") (footnote omitted).
160 H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6874
(emphasis added).
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